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Power of the Minnesota Probate
Court To Modify Its Decrees
Probatedecrees are not open to collateral attack in Minnesota; relief from an erroneous decree can be obtained
only by appeal, by independent action in the district court,
or by application to the probate court. The author of this
Note analyzes the power of the probate court to grant
such relief and some of the problems that arise in the
exercise of that power. He concludes that although the
power of the probate court is sufficient to prevent manifest injustice, there is a need for legislative action to
clarify some existing uncertainties.
INTRODUCTION
The administration of a decedent's estate in the probate court is
a proceeding in rem, and if the court has jurisdiction, a decree
entered by it-whether in the form of a decree of distribution,'
an order allowing a claim against the estate,2 or an order allowing the account of the personal representative 3 -is not open to
collateral attack.' Thus, unless the decree is reversed or modified
in a direct proceeding, it is binding on all persons interested in
the estate, even if under a disability or not yet in being.' There
are three methods of directly attacking a probate decree in Min1. See, e.g., Stumer v. Hibbing Gen. Hosp., 242 Minn. 371, 65 N.W.
2d 609 (1954); Wold v. Peoples Trust & Say. Bank, 179 Minn. 523,
229 N.W. 785 (1930); Rickert v. Wardell, 142 Minn. 96, 170 N.W. 915
(1919); Ladd . Weiskopf, 62 Minn. 29, 64 N.W. 99 (1895).
2. See, e.g., In re Estate of Jordan, 199 Minn. 53, 271 N.W. 104

(1937).
3. See, e.g., In re Estate of Woodworth, 207 Minn. 563, 292 N.W.
192 (1940).
4. Some probate orders appear not to be res judicata until the final

decree of distribution is entered and the probate court's jurisdiction over

the estate is terminated. Apparently only those orders during the adminis-

tration of the estate that adjudicate the rights as between the estate and

third persons are considered to have the characteristics of a judgment. See
In re Estate of Woodworth, 207 Minn. 563, 291 N.W. 192 (1940). Thus,
although there is not specific authority to this effect, it would appear that

an order admitting a will to probate might be open to collateral attack
until the final decree of distribution is entered.
5. Bengston v. Setterberg, 227 Minn. 337, 35 N.W.2d 623 (1949); Wold

v. Peoples Trust & Say. Bank, 179 Minn. 523, 229 N.W. 785 (1903); Rickert
v. Wardell, 142 Minn. 96, 170 N.W. 915 (1919); Ladd v. Weiskopf, 62
Minn. 29, 64 N.W. 99 (1895).
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nesota: by appeal, by independent action in equity in the district
court, and by motion or petition to the probate court.6
Section 525.71 of the Minnesota Probate Code enumerates the
orders and decrees of the probate court from which an appeal
may be taken to the district court. 7 The party seeking such relief
has a period of six months from the filing of the order or decree within which to perfect his appeal. If he is served with notice of the filing of the order or decree, however, the period allotted for appeal is reduced to 30 days after such service.' On
appeal, the district court must try the issues de novo, exercising
its discretion as if the case had been brought there in the first
instance rather than merely reviewing the exercise of discretion by
the probate court.9
Although it is clear that a district court sitting as a court of
equity may grant relief from a probate decree in an independent
action brought for that purpose,1" the grounds upon which such
relief may be granted have not been authoritatively defined. The
6. Stumer v. Hibbing Gen. Hosp., 242 Minn. 371, 65 N.W.2d 609 (1954)
(dictum). There has never been an attempt to utilize the ancillary writs of
coram nobis, coram vobis, and audita querela or bills of review in Minnesota probate proceedings. The question of whether such procedures are
available to correct probate decrees is beyond the scope of this Note.
7. MINN. STAT. § 525.71 (1961).
8. MINN. STAT. § 525.712 (1961).

9. MINN. STAT. § 725.72 (1961); In re Estate of Heneke, 220 Minn.
414, 19 N.W.2d 718 (1945); In re Guardianship of Strom, 205 Minn.
399, 286 N.W. 245 (1939).
10. Stumer v. Hibbing Gen. Hosp., 242 Minn. 371, 65 N.W.2d 609
(1954) (dictum); Dewolf v. Ericson, 175 Minn. 68, 220 N.W. 406 (1928)
(dictum); Schmitz v. Martin, 149 Minn. 386, 183 N.W. 978 (1921);
Bruski v. Bruski, 148 Minn. 458, 182 N.W. 620 (1921) (dictum); Savela
v. Erickson, 138 Minn. 93, 163 N.W. 1029 (1917) (dictum).
A party seeking equitable relief from a probate decree must, in drafting
his pleadings, keep in mind the requirement that the proceeding must be a
direct attack upon the decree and not collateral. To constitute a direct attack, relief from the decree must be the primary relief prayed for and must
not be merely incidental to another form of relief sought. Thus, in Stumer
v. Hibbing Gen. Hosp., 242 Minn. 371, 65 N.W.2d 609 (1954), the plaintiff,
a former executor of an estate, brought an action in the district court
against the defendants, who had been his attorneys in the administration
proceedings, to recover fees and expenses allowed them by the probate
court. The plaintiff alleged that defendants had procured the allowance of
these fees and expenses by means of fraud. The court held that the action would not lie, saying:
Plaintiff's complaint, although alleging fraud, completely ignores
the decree and judgment of the probate court and asks for no other
relief than the recovery of a specific sum or sums of money theretofore allowed to the defendants by such probate decree. Any attack
here upon the decree or judgment of that court is purely secondary or
incidental and is therefore collateral.
Id. at 375, 65 N.W.2d at 612.
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closest the Minnesota Supreme Court has come to stating these
grounds is the general assertion that equitable relief may be granted where a probate decree has been obtained by fraud or has resulted from a mistake of fact.' There is only one reported case
in Minnesota in which such relief was granted. In that case,
Schmitz v.*Martin,' it was held that the district court could properly set aside a final decree of distribution where the defendant in
procuring the decree, which had excluded the plaintiff, had concealed from the probate court the facts of plaintiff's existence and
her right to share in the estate. Since the prayer for this form of
relief invokes the equity jurisdiction of the district court, the appropriate time limitation for the bringing of the action would be
that prescribed by the doctrine of laches.' 3
The third method of direct attack of a probate decree-by motion or petition addressed to the probate court itself--constitutes
the principle subject of this Note. Section 525.02(4) of the Minnesota Probate Code, under which the probate court derives the
power to grant relief from a prior decree, grants the probate
court power:
To correct, modify, or amend its records to conform to the facts, and

to correct its final decrees so as to include therein property omitted
from the same or from administration ....

It is the purpose of this Note to describe and analyze the power
that section 525.02(4) has been interpreted as conferring upon the
probate court and to attempt to reveal any deficiencies existing
with respect to that power.
I.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE STATUTORY POWER OF
THE PROBATE COURT TO ALTER, AMEND, OR
VACATE ITS DECREES

Jurisdiction over the administration of decedents' estates is conferred upon the Minnesota probate court by article 6, section 6 of
11. See Robinson v. Thomson, 137 Minn. 446, 163 N.W. 786 (1917)

(dictum); Leighton v. Bruce, 132 Minn. 176, 156 N.W. 285 (1916) (dictum).
12. 149 Minn. 386, 183 N.W. 978 (1921).
13. In In re Estate of Simon, 187 Minn. 399, 246 N.W. 31 (1932), it
was contended that the probate court had power to grant relief from its
decrees commensurate to that of the district sitting as a court of equity

and, thus, that the probate court was not bound by the absolute time limitations prescribed by statute. The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected this
contention on the ground that the probate court does not have general
equity jurisdiction as does the district court.
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the Minnesota Constitution, 4 and once acquired, jurisdiction is
retained throughout the entire administration of the estate.' 5 When
the final decree of distribution is made, however, the estate passes

out of the court's control, and its jurisdiction is terminated.'"

Thus, in 1872 the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the probate court had no power to modify its decrees after the estate had
been distributed.'" The power of the probate court to grant such
relief was first recognized in Minnesota in the 1884 case of In the
Matter of Estate of Gragg.'s The decisive factor in this reversal
of position by the court was a statutory enactment of 1877, which

provided for an appeal to the district court from an order of the

probate court "vacating or refusing to vacate a previous order."' 9
Although not a direct grant of power, the statute was interpreted
as impliedly vesting the probate court with at least some power
to reconsider its decrees.
It was not until 1889 that the Minnesota Legislature enacted
what can in reality be called the forerunner of the present section 525.02(4). This enactment provided that "the probate court
may at any time, correct, modify or amend its records to conform
with the facts in the same manner as a district court.""° The Minnesota Supreme Court interpreted the limiting phrase, "in the same
manner as the district court," to mean that the power of the pro14.
The probate court shall have unlimited original jurisdiction in law
and equity for the administration of the estates of deceased persons
and all guardianship and incompetency proceedings, and such further
jurisdiction over the administration of trust estates and for the determination of taxes contingent upon death ....
MINN. CONST. art. 6, § 6.
15. Boltz v. Schultz, 61 Minn. 444, 64 N.W. 48 (1895); Rice v. Dickerman, 47 Minn. 527, 50 N.W. 698 (1891); Culver v. Hardenbergh, 37
Minn. 225, 33 N.W. 792 (1887).
16. State ex rel. Matteson v. Probate Court, 84 Minn. 289, 87 N.W.
783 (1901).
17. State ex rel. Prendergast v. Probate Court, 19 Minn. 117 (1872).
In this case, application was made to the probate court for a revocation of
its previous order confirming a sale of property by the executor. In holding that a writ of prohibition should issue against such proceedings in
the probate court, the Minnesota Supreme Court said:
If this judge can re-examine the decrees of his predecessor, there is
no reason why his successor should not re-examine his, and so on indefinitely.
The decree confirming the sale was either final, i.e., the end of
that proceedings, or it was not. If it were final, it "is to stand unless
itis reversed or reformed on appeal," "or is adjudged to be void in
some collateral proceedings."
Id. at 127-28.
18. 32 Minn. 142, 19 N.W. 651 (1884).
19. Minn. Laws 1877, ch. 22, § 1, at 61.
20. Minn. Laws 1889, ch. 46, § 315, at 156. (Emphasis added.)
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bate court to grant relief from its decrees was the same as the
power of the district court to grant relief from its judgments and,
thus, that such relief could be granted only upon the grounds and
2
within the limitation periods prescribed for the district court. '
The limiting phrase could have been quite differently interpreted
as illustrated by the New York Court of Appeal's construction of
section 20(6) of the New York Surrogate Court Act in which
the same limiting phrase is employed. The New York court held
that the surrogate court in granting relief from its decrees must
only proceed in the same way-by giving notice, providing a hearing, and requiring the same proof of error-as the court to which
reference was made.' Thus, it was found that the limiting phrase
was not intended to impose upon the New York surrogate court
the limitation periods imposed upon other courts; indeed, the phrase
"at any time" was interpreted literally, and the power of the surrogate court to grant relief from its decrees was not limited in
time.'
Of the two interpretations, the one adopted by the New York
courts seems the more literal. But putting aside the question of the
correct mechanical interpretation, both positions can claim the support of some rather substantial policy considerations. The New
York interpretation was founded on a recognition of the dissimilarity between probate proceedings and proceedings in other courts.
Proceedings in the district court, for example, are usually adversary in nature; the parties face each other on equal terms,
upon more or less well defined issues, and are usually represented by counsel vested with the duty of protecting their interests.
On the other hand, probate proceedings are usually rather informal and cannot be accurately characterized as adversary in na21. Tomlinson v. Phelps, 93 Minn. 350, 101 N.W. 496 (1904).

22. See In the Matter of Account of Henderson, 157 N.Y. 423, 52

N.E. 183, affirming 33 App. Div. 545, 3 N.Y. Supp. 957 (1898). Section

20(6) of the New York Surrogate Court Act provides the surrogate's court
with power to vacate or modify a decree for "fraud, newly-discovered
evidence, clerical error, or other sufficient cause," but further provides
that such power "must be exercised only in a like case and in the same
manner, as a court of record . . . ." (Emphasis added.) Sections 108, 521,
and 528 of the New York Civil Practice Act provided the applicable time
limitations for motions to set aside a judgment in a court of record. It
was originally held in In the Matter of Estate of Hesdra, 4 Misc. 37,
3 N.Y. Supp. 846 (Surr. Ct. 1893), that these time limitations applicable
to courts of record were incorporated by reference into § 20(6) of the
Surrogate Court Act and, thus, that the surrogate's court, in amending and
vacating its orders and decrees, was bound by these limitations. However,
Hesdra was impliedly repudiated by the Henderson case. See also In the
Matter of Flynn, 136 N.Y. 287, 32 N.E. 767 (1892); In the Matter of Estate of Mather, 41 Misc. 414 (Surr. Ct. 1903).
23. See In the Matter of Henderson, 157 N.Y. 423, 52 N.E. 183 (1898).
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ture. Interested parties are often not represented by counsel, and
furthermore, since probate proceedings are frequently ex parte,
some interested parties may not even learn of the proceedings until
long after the entry of an unfavorable order or decree. There is,
therefore, a greater likelihood that error committed in probate
proceedings will remain undiscovered for a longer period of time
than error committed in district court proceedings. Notwithstanding this fact, however, the Minnesota interpretation, which places
a time limitation upon the power of the probate court to modify
or vacate its decrees, may be preferable in order that finality can
be accorded to probate decrees at some definite time. The universally recognized principle that matters once litigated should
not be continually subject to the threat of relitigation is especially
compelling in the area of probate proceedings since the title to
realty is frequently involved and a great deal of uncertainty surrounding such title is likely to exist if probate decrees can be
modified or vacated at any time.2 4
With the 1905 revision of the Minnesota Statutes, the supreme
court's literally questionable interpretation of the forerunner of the
present section 525.02(4) became a moot question. The revision
produced an amendment to the statute that caused it to correspond
with the court's interpretation of the 1889 act. Thus, the words
"in the same manner as the district court" were deleted, and it
was provided that the "probate courts shall have the same power
as district courts" to modify their decrees.' The statute remained
in this form until 1935.
In the revised Minnesota Probate Code, adopted in 1935, section 525.02(4) was amended into its present form. The reference to the powers of the district court was deleted completely,
thus apparently leaving the power of the probate court to grant
relief from its decrees unlimited.2" It is extremely unlikely, how24.
Final decrees of the probate court are of great importance, embracing as they so often do the devolution of title to real estate. It is
to be presumed that they express the deliberate judgment of that

court upon the construction of wills where such direct the disposition
of property.

In re Estate of Turner, 181 Minn. 528, 532, 233 N.W. 305, 306 (1930).
25. Minn. Rev. Laws 1905, ch. 74, § 3633.
26. Section 525.02 now reads:
In addition to its general powers, the probate court shall have
power:
(4) To correct, modify, or amend its records to conform to the facts,
and to correct its final decrees so as to include therein property omitted from the same or from administration;
MINN. STAT.

§ 525.02(4) (1961).
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ever, that such a result was intended. Judge Albin Pearson, a
member of the revisory committee responsible for the drafting of
the revised code, indicated that it effected no change in the power
of the probate court to modify its decrees.' Thus, the Minnesota

decisions subsequent to the 1935 amendment have refused to lend
any significance to the deletion of the reference to the powers of
the district court and have continued to equate the power of the
probate court to grant relief from its decrees to that of the district
courts.'
H.

THE PRESENT POWER OF THE PROBATE COURT
TO GRANT RELIEF UNDER SECTION 525.02(4)

Since section 525.02(4) has been interpreted as bestowing upon
the probate court the same power to modify its decrees as the
district court, the statutory provisions defining the power of the
district court are also applicable to the probate court. Those provisions are sections 544.32' and 548.1430 of the Minnesota Stat-

utes. In addition to the powers granted by these sections, the probate court, like the district court, possesses certain
statutory powers to correct clerical and judicial error.3 '

extra-

27. Judge Pearson, writing about the new 1935 Minnesota Probate Code
and particularly about § 525.02(4), stated:
The revisers, realizing the importance of the subsection and their inability to comprehend the full import of its provisions and of the decisions of the Minnesota Supreme Court with reference thereto, made
no change whatever in the wording. While the language of this subsection appears to be perfectly clear, practically every competent and
experienced lawyer knows that it does not and cannot mean what it
apparently says, for no restrictions as to time or circumstances are
mentioned.
Pearson, Minnesota Probate Practice, 20 MTNN. L. REV. 707, 718
(1936). Furthermore, in attempting to define the power of the probate
court to grant relief, Judge Pearson cites pre-1935 cases, some of which
deal with the power of the district court to grant relief from its judgments.
Id. at 718 nn.36-39.
28. In re Estate of Gooch, 212 Minn. 272, 3 N.W.2d 494 (1942); In re
Estate of Showell, 209 Minn. 539, 297 N.W. 111 (1941); In re Estate of
Daniel, 208 Minn. 420, 294 N.W. 465 (1940); In re Estate of Woodworth, 207 Minn. 563, 292 N.W. 192 (1940).
29. Section 544.32 was superseded with respect to the district court by
MINN. R. Civ. P. 60.02, see note 55 infra, and no longer appears in the
Minnesota Statutes. This provision first appeared in the territorial statutes
of 1851, Minn. Terr. Rev. Laws 1851, ch. 70, § 90, and was § 9283 of the
Minnesota Statutes of 1927. For convenience, it will continue to be cited
as § 544.32 throughout this Note.
30. MINN. STAT. § 548.14 (1961).
31. See In re Estate of Simon, 187 Minn. 399, 246 N.W. 31 (1932);
Savela v. Erickson, 138 Minn. 93, 163 N.W. 1029 (1917). MINN. R. CIv. P.
60.01 has codified the power of the district court to grant relief from
clerical error.

1086

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:1079

There are some general limitations upon the power of the probate court to grant relief from a decree. This power cannot be
exercised without first giving notice to persons whose interests will
be affected."2 Furthermore, the probate court cannot modify a

decree after it has been affirmed on appeal except with leave of the
appellate court.3 Also, the application for relief from a probate
decree does not suspend the operation of that decree so as to extend the period within which an appeal may be taken. 4
A.

THE POWER

To

CORRECT CLERICAL AND JUDICIAL ERROR

The probate court's power to grant relief from its decrees varies
with the grounds upon which such relief is sought. That power is
most extensive in the case of clerical error, which may be corrected
at any time, even upon the court's own motion. Notwithstanding
this unlimited power, however, a party may lose his right to have a

clerical error corrected as a result of the doctrine of laches3 "

But a mere delay in seeking correction alone will not have this effect; for a denial of relief to be justified on the basis of delay, other

parties must have placed themselves in such a position in reliance
upon the decree that they will be seriously prejudiced if relief is
granted.37
In comparison with its power to correct clerical error, the pro32. In re Estate of Koffel, 175 Minn. 524, 222 N.W. 68 (1928).
33. County of Traverse v. Veigel, 179 Minn. 589, 229 N.W. 882 (1930).
34. See 3 YOUNGQUIST & BLACIK, MINNESOTA RULES OF PRACTICE 359

(1953).
35. See, e.g., Barrett v. Macdonald, 121 N.W.2d 165 (Minn. 1963); In re
Estate of Simon, 187 Minn. 399, 246 N.W. 31 (1932) (dictum); Wilson v.
City of Fergus Falls, 181 Minn. 329, 232 N.W. 322 (1930); McClure v.
Bruck, 43 Minn. 305, 45 N.W. 438 (1890). In fact, it appears that the
probate court not only has the power to correct such error, but that it
may have the duty to do so in certain cases. Thus, in National Council of
Knights v. Silver, 138 Minn. 330, 333, 164 N.W. 1013, 1015 (1917), the
court said in answer to the contention that the power to relieve from
clerical error is discretionary:
This is, in general, true . . . . It is true in cases which call for the
exercise of judicial discretion, as where questions of fact arise, or the
situation of the parties has changed, or the rights of third parties have
intervened . . . . But in a case where the mistake is conceded, where
it is material, where the judgment is unexecuted, and the parties are
still in status quo and the rights of no third parties have intervened,
the parties are entitled as a matter of right to the judgment the court
has ordered, and it is the duty of the court to correct the mistake.
It has also been held that because of the delay and expense incident to an
appeal, a party must seek relief from a clerical error in the court in which
the error was committed before seeking relief from such an error by appeal. State v. Currie, 72 Minn. 403, 75 N.W. 742 (1898); Hall v. Merrill,
47 Minn. 260, 49 N.W. 980 (1891).
36. Nell v. Dayton, 47 Minn. 257, 49 N.W. 981 (1891).
37. Ibid.
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bate court's power to grant relief from judicial error is rather limited. Such error may be corrected only upon motion made during
the period alloted for appeal.3 Thus, the period within which the
court may correct judicial error is directly dependent upon whether
the party seeking relief was served with notice of the filing of the
decree, but it will in no case greatly exceed six months after entry
of the decree.3 9
In view of the differing periods within which relief may be
granted, the distinction between clerical and judicial error is extremely important. Since both types of error represent error committed on the behalf of the court, however, the distinction may
give rise to a factual question that is extremely difficult to resolve.
Both types of error can perhaps best be described in terms of their
results.
A clerical error is a mechanical error or inadvertent omission
that results in the decree not reading as the court intended."0
Where a decree contains clerical error, at least a portion of the
court's determination on the merits will not be given effect. Clerical error may be committed either by an employee of the court4
or by the court itself,4 2 and may take the form of a mistake in
computing interest on various items included in a decree,' 3 an
omission of a clause that the court intended to include in a decree," or the inadvertent insertion of a clause in a decree not intended to be included.' 5 The Minnesota Supreme Court has said
that a clerical error "includes one made by the court which cannot
38. In re Estate of Simon, 187 Minn. 399, 246 N.W. 31 (1932); Savela

v. Erickson, 138 Minn. 93, 163 N.W. 1029 (1917); Tomlinson v. Phelps,

93 Minn. 350, 101 N.W. 496 (1904). In Gelin v. Hollister, 222 Minn. 339,
24 N.W.2d 496 (1946), the court held that the district court could set aside
or vacate its judgment for judicial error after the period for appeal had
expired upon a motion made before the expiration of that period.
39. See note 8 supra and accompanying text for the effect of service
of notice of the filing of a decree upon the period for appeal.

40. Barrett v. Macdonald, 121 N.W.2d 165 (Minn. 1963); Wilson v.
City of Fergus Falls, 181 Minn. 329, 232 N.W. 322 (1930); Chase v. Whit-

ten, 62 Minn. 498, 65 N.W. 84 (1895); Knappen v. Freeman, 47 Minn.
491, 50 N.W. 533 (1891).
41. See Barrett v. Macdonald, 121 N.W.2d 165 (Minn. 1963); Knappen v.
Freeman, 47 Minn. 491 (1891); Hall v. Merrill, 47 Minn. 260 (1891);
Nell v. Dayton, 47 Minn. 257 (1891); McClure v. Bruck, 43 Minn. 305,

45 N.W. 438 (1890).

42. See Chase v. Whitten, 62 Minn. 498, 65 N.W. 84 (1895).

43. See Knappen v. Freeman, 47 Minn. 491, 50 N.W. 533 (1891).

44. See Wilson v. City of Fergus Falls, 181 Minn. 329, 232 N.W. 322
(1930).

45. Chase v. Whitten, 62 Minn. 498, 65 N.W. 84 (1895).
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reasonably be attributed to the exercise of judicial consideration or
discretion."4
Judicial error is error committed by the court when it actually
considers a matter and decides it incorrectly.' 7 The decree, although erroneous, will correspond to the intention of the court:48
The decree will actually give effect to the court's determination on
the merits, but that determination will itself be erroneous. Consider, for example, the case of Leighton v. Bruce,49 in which a
party was seeking relief from an allegedly erroneous construction
of a will. The court, assuming the construction of the will to be
erroneous, found that the construction had been deliberately made
by the court and that any error, therefore, constituted judicial error and could not be corrected after the period for appeal had
expired.
From the foregoing descriptions and examples of clerical and
judicial error, it should be obvious that the question of which
type of error is involved in a particular case turns on the
question of whether the court actually intended what the decree
expounds. Because the court's intention may be extremely difficult
to ascertain, the question of whether the error in a particular case
is clerical or judicial is potentially a very difficult one. Furthermore, when the period for appeal has expired and it is no longer
within the court's power to correct judicial error, the burden is on
the party seeking relief to establish that the error is clerical."0
Notwithstanding the difficulty in distinguishing between clerical and judicial error, however, the distinction does have a great
deal of merit. The different time periods within which a party
must seek relief from the two types of error are readily explainable. The party injured by judicial error has had his day in court
and knows that the matter was decided against him. If he
thinks the court's decision erroneous, he has an adequate opportunity to seek relief either by application to the probate court or
by appeal; the fact that he must proceed within the period for
appeal should be no impediment to his obtaining relief. On the
other hand, although a party injured as a result of clerical error
has had his day in court, he relies upon the fact that the court has
reached a decision favorable to him. The fact that the decree
does not give effect to that decision is not attributable to his
46. Wilson v. City of Fergus Falls, 181 Minn. 329, 332, 232 N.W. 322,
323 (1930).
47. Ibid.; Leighton v. Bruce, 132 Minn. 176, 156 N.W. 285 (1916).
48. See In re Estate of Simon, 187 Minn. 399, 246 N.W. 31 (1932).
49. 132 Minn. 176, 156 N.W. 285 (1916).
50. Leighton v. Bruce, 132 Minn. 176, 156 N.W. 285 (1916).
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fault. Such a person may not discover the error for a substantial
period of time, and thus, he may not be able to proceed for relief

within the period allotted for appeal.
Furthermore, the court actually changes its decision on the merits by correcting judicial error. To permit the court to do this for
more than a very limited period of time would contravene the prin-

ciple that matters once decided should be binding upon the parties. On the other hand, in correcting clerical error, the court is
merely amending the decree to correspond to its decision. Since
it is in no way changing its decision, but merely giving effect to it,
the principle of finality is not infringed.
B.

THE POWER To RELIEVE A PARTY FROM HIS OWN MISTAKE
AND FOR GOOD CAUSE SHOWN

Section 544.32 of the Minnesota Statutes, applicable to the dis-

trict court directly5 ' and to the probate court by virtue of judicial

construction of section 525.02(4),52 states two grounds upon

which relief may be granted from a decree. The court is authorized to relieve a party from a decree resulting from "his mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect"53 and also to relieve
a party from a decree "for good cause shown." In either case,

relief may be granted only upon application made within one year
after the party seeking relief received actual notice of the decree."
51. MINN. R. CIV. P. 60.02 has superseded § 544.32 with respect to the
district court. See note 55 infra.
52. See cases cited note 28 supra.
53. E.g., In re Estate of Gooch, 212 Minn. 272, 3 N.W.2d 494 (1942);
In re Estate of Simon, 187 Minn. 399, 246 N.W. 31 (1932).
54. E.g., Holmes v. Conter, 209 Minn. 144, 295 N.W. 649 (1941); In
re Estate of Simon, 187 Minn. 399, 246 N.W. 31 (1932); Alexander v.
Hutchins, 158 Minn. 391, 197 N.W. 754 (1924).
55. MINN. STAT. § 544.32 (1961); Holmes v. Conter, 209 Minn. 144,
295 N.W. 649 (1941); In re Estate of Simon, 187 Minn. 399, 246 N.W.
31 (1932). Cf. National Council of Knights v. Canter, 132 Minn. 354, 157
N.W. 586 (1916).
MINN. R. Crv. P. 60.02, although providing the same limitation period,
provides that the one year period shall commence to run from the entry
of the judgment rather than from notice of the judgment. Because of this
and other conflicts with § 544.32, Rule 60.02 supersedes that section with
respect to the district court. See 3 YOUNGQUIST & BLACIK, MINNESOTA
RULES OF PRACTICE 356 (1953). In view of the construction of § 525.02(4)
under which the powers of the probate court are equated to those of the
district court, the question arises of whether Rule 60.02 has also effected
a change in the powers of the probate court. This question has not yet
arisen before the Minnesota Supreme Court. When it does, however, it
would appear that it must be resolved by considering the chronological sequence of two conflicting statutory provisions. The first provision, § 525.02
(4), interpreted as conferring upon the probate court the power identical
to that of the district court to grant relief from prior decrees, was enacted
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Even though a party applies for such relief within the prescribed
period, however, he may be barred by laches if he did not proceed with diligence and another party was prejudiced by the unnecessary delay.5" Furthermore, a party applying for relief under this section, even though proceeding with diligence and within
the prescribed period, is not entitled to relief as a matter of right. 7
Whether relief should be granted in a particular case is within
the discretion of the court,58 but the purpose of this section is to
in its present form in 1935. Minn. Sess. Laws 1935, ch. 72, § 2, at 112.
On the other hand, the second provision, § 480.051 of the Minnesota
Statutes, authorizing the Supreme Court to promulgate the rules of civil
procedure but explicitly excluding from the authorization the power to regulate procedure in the probate court, was enacted in 1947. Minn. Sess.
Laws 1947, ch. 498, § 1, at 828. It would appear that the statutory provision enacted later in time, which withholds from the court the power to
regulate probate court procedure, should take precedence. Furthermore,
disregarding for the moment the chronological sequence of these provisions, it would be rather illogical to allow § 480.051, which is concerned
directly with the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure and provides in substance that they shall not be applicable to the probate court, to be circumvented by finding Rule 60 indirectly applicable to the probate court by
virtue of § 525.02(4), which was not at all concerned with the rules. The
probate court of Hennepin County has held that Rule 60 is inapplicable
to probate proceedings. In the Matter of the Estate of Kistler, File No.
92929, Henn. County P. Ct., July 28, 1960 (Peterson, J.).
There is a two-fold advantage in having the limitation period commence
on a definite point in time such as entry of judgment rather than a variable event such as notice of the judgment. In the first place, it eliminates the necessity of determining the potentially difficult factual question of
when the party seeking relief received notice of the judgment. Secondly,
it insures that within the prescribed period of one year the judgment will
become absolute, whereas under § 544.32, one cannot say when the judgment will become absolute since the question depends on a variable event.
In view of the special nature of probate proceedings, however, the disadvantage of having the period with which the probate court can grant
relief from mistake or "for good cause" commence upon the entry of the
decree may outweigh the advantages. An interested party may be without
knowledge of probate proceedings for a substantial period of time after
they have transpired. Thus, if the availability to such a party of relief from
a decree entered in those proceedings is dependent upon when the decree
was entered rather than when he acquired notice of them, he may never
have the opportunity to assert his claim.
56. In re Estate of Holum, 179 Minn. 315, 229 N.W. 133 (1930);
Alexander v. Hutchins, 158 Minn. 391, 197 N.W. 754 (1924); Kipp v.
Clinger, 97 Minn. 135, 106 N.W. 108 (1906).
57. MiNN. STAT. § 544.32 (1961) states "the court . . . in its discretion .

. . ."

See In re Estate of Butler, 183 Minn. 591, 237 N.W. 592

(1931); In re Estate of Walker, 183 Minn. 325, 266 N.W. 485 (1931); In re
Estate of Holum, 179 Minn. 315, 229 N.W. 133 (1930); Johnson v. Hallman, 177 Minn. 619, 225 N.W. 283 (1929).
58. An order of the probate court vacating or refusing to vacate a
previous appealable order or decree is an appealable order. MINN. STAT.
§ 525.71(11) (1961). The appeal is taken to the district court in the first
instance and the issue of whether the order or decree should have been
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promote justice, and it should, therefore, be liberally construed in
furtherance of that purpose. 9 The power conferred by this section
does not, however, include the power to correct judicial error after
the expiration of the period for appeal.6"
The clause "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect" in section 544.32 is qualified by the pronoun "his," and thus,
relief under that clause would seem to be justified only where
the decree results from the unilateral mistake of the party seeking
relief. This clause has been found broad enough, however, to include decrees resulting from the mistake of the party's counsel as
well as the party himself."1 Furthermore, there is an indication
that the pronoun "his" was not intended to limit the power to
grant relief from a decree, but rather, was intended to preserve
the court's unlimited power to set aside a consent decree that resulted from the mutual mistake of the parties by excluding such
power from the statute and the limitation period it imposes. Read in this light, it can with fair assurance be assumed that the
second clause of section 544.32-"for good cause shown"-was
intended to confer the power to grant relief from a decree resulting
from the mistake of a person other than the party seeking relief.
All of the reported cases in which a party has obtained relief
from the consequences of either his mistake or that of his attorney
involved default decrees resulting from a failure to appear at the
hearing or to file and serve the necessary papers. Relevant considerations in determining whether relief should be granted in such
cases are whether the default is excusable, whether other interested parties will be seriously prejudiced, whether the party seeking
relief has proceeded with diligence, and whether he has a merivacated is tried de novo with the district court exercising the same discretion as the probate court. See note 9 supra and accompanying text; In re

Estate of Holum, 179 Minn. 315, 229 N.W. 133 (1930). Upon appeal to the
supreme court, the question raised is whether the district court abused its
discretion in granting or denying the relief sought. See In re Estate of
Butler, 183 Minn. 591, 237 N.W. 592 (1931).
59. Holmes v. Conter, 209 Minn. 144, 295 N.W. 649 (1941); Stebbins
v. Friend, Crosby & Co., 178 Minn. 549, 228 N.W. 150 (1929).
60. See, e.g., State ex rel. Wendland v. Probate Court, 221 Minn. 333,
22 N.W.2d 448 (1946); Holmes v. Conter, 209 Minn. 144, 295 N.W.
649 (1941) (dictum); In re Estate of Simon, 187 Minn. 399, 246 N.W.
31 (1932); Alexander v. Hutchins, 158 Minn. 391, 197 N.W. 754 (1924).
61. Kennedy v. Torodor, 201 Minn. 422, 276 N.W. 650 (1937); In re
Estate of Walker, 183 Minn. 325, 236 N.W. 485 (1931); Unowsky v.
Show, 161 Minn. 489, 201 N.W. 936 (1925). MINN. R. Cry. P. 60.02 does
not contain the qualifying word "his," thus removing all doubt as to the
power to grant relief for the mistakes of persons other than the party
seeking relief.
62. Elsen v. State Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 219 Minn. 315, 17 N.W.
2d 652 (1945).

1092

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:1079

torious claim or defense to assert if the decree is vacated.

3

In

fact, notwithstanding the discretionary nature of the power conferred by this section, there is some indication that it would be
reversible error for the probate court to vacate the default decree if the default is not excusable, if the claim or defense to be

raised lacks merit, or if the party seeking relief has been guilty of
unnecessary delay."4

The supreme court has displayed a tendency toward leniency
in finding that a default is excusable. Consider, for example, the
case of In re Estate of Walker,65 where the executors of the es-

tate were apprised of only one claim against the estate, the amount
and validity of which they had no intention of disputing. However,
another claim against the estate was filed, and upon the failure of
the executors or their attorney to appear on the day designated
for the hearing of claims, that claim was allowed by default.
Approximately nine months later, the order allowing the claim was
vacated upon application by the executors and leave was granted to file objection to the claim. On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed, finding the failure to appear excusable,
and indicated that in cases such as this where the disputed claim
lacked merit on its face or was itself suggestive of a valid defense,
the courts should be strongly inclined to grant the party seeking
6 the
relief his day in court. Similarly, in In re Estate of Daniel,"
63. In re Estate of Walker, 183 Minn. 325, 336 N.W. 485 (1931);
Barrie v. Northern Assur. Co., 99 Minn. 272, 109 N.W. 248 (1906).
64. See cases cited note 63 supra. In Osman v. Wisted, 78 Minn. 295,
80 N.W. 1127 (1899), the Minnesota court indicated that it would be an
abuse of discretion to grant relief from a default where there was no evidence that the default was excusable or it did not appear that the claim the
party seeking relief wished to assert possessed substantial merit. In National Council of Knights v. Canter, 132 Minn. 354, 157 N.W. 586 (1916),
the court held it was an abuse of discretion to grant relief where the
party had delayed nine months after having notice of the judgment
without considering whether anyone was prejudiced by the delay.
65. 183 Minn. 325, 236 N.W. 485 (1931).
66. 208 Minn. 420, 294 N.W. 465 (1940). See also Larson v. How, 71
Minn. 250, 73 N.W. 966 (1898), where it was held that failure to appear
at a hearing for the admission of a will to probate was excusable in view
of the established fact that the party seeking relief had no knowledge
of the probate proceedings; it was, therefore, an abuse of discretion on
the part of the probate court to refuse to vacate the order admitting the
will and allow objection to the will.
MINN. STAT. § 525.83 (1961), prescribing the notice of hearing to be
given in probate proceedings, provides in substance that such notice shall
be given once a week for three consecutive weeks in a legal newspaper
in the county where such proceedings are pending and that such notice
shall be mailed to such heirs, devisees, and legatees whose names and addresses are known. This section applies to hearings on the admission of a
will to probate, MINN. STAT. § 525.24 (1961); hearings for approval of the
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court held that where a tort claimant was without notice that the
deceased tortfeasor's estate was being probated, his failure to appear and assert his claim was excusable and the probate court
should, upon application seasonably made, vacate its final decree
and allow the claim to be interposed.
What types of mistakes, other than excusable default, justify
relief under the first clause of section 544.32 is a question unanswered by Minnesota decisions. But it may be speculated that
where the party was actually present at the hearing and had the
opportunity to present his case, relief from a decree resulting
from the failure to raise a claim or defense that reasonably could
have and should have been raised or relief from a decree resulting
from poor trial tactics will not be found justified.
The grounds upon which relief may be granted under the "for
good cause shown" clause of section 544.32 are not very elaborately defined by the case law. This clause has not been the subject matter of frequent litigation. The only type of relief that can
be said with certainty to be attainable under this clause is relief
for newly discovered evidence that reasonable diligence would
not have disclosed at the time of the hearing. 7 In such a case,
assuming the other requisites of 544.32 to be met, the probate
court would be justified in vacating its prior decree to admit the
new evidence. 8 There is also some indication that intrinsic fraud
or perjury69 constitutes "good cause" and, thus, that relief may
be granted under this clause from a decree obtained by such
means.71 There is no express holding to that effect, however.
The question of whether the mistake of a person other than the
party seeking relief constitutes "good cause" has not yet arisen before the Minnesota Supreme Court. In view of the authority to relieve a party from his own mistake, however, it would indeed apadministrator's account and decree of distribution, MINN. STAT. § 525.481
(1961); and hearings on the determination of descent, MINN. STAT.
§ 525.312 (1961). Thus, it is apparent that the likelihood that an interested
party may be without knowledge of probate proceedings is quite substan-

tial.

67. Holmes v. Conter, 209 Minn. 144, 295 N.W. 649 (1941); State ex
rel. Kelmer v. District Court, 134 Minn. 189, 158 N.W. 825 (1916); Sheffield v. Mullin, 28 Minn. 251, 9 N.W. 756 (1881). These cases indicate

that the district court can grant relief under § 544.32 on the basis of
newly discovered evidence, and in view of the identity of the powers of the
probate and district court in this respect, the power to grant relief from
newly discovered evidence is also possessed by the probate court.
68. See cases cited note 67 supra.
69. See notes 77 & 78 infra and accompanying text for definition of
intrinsic fraud or perjury.
70. See In re Estate of Jordan, 199 Minn. 53, 271 N.W. 104 (1937)
(dictum).
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pear to be an anomalous result if the court could not also grant
relief in the more compelling case where the mistake is attributable
to someone else.
C.

THE POWER

To RELIEVE A PARTY FROM A DECREE OB-

TAINED BY ANOTHER PARTY BY MEANS OF FRAUD OR PERJURY

Section 548.14 of the Minnesota Statutes, applicable to the district court directly and to the probate court by virtue of section
525.02 (4),71 provides:
Any judgment obtained . .. by means of perjury, subornation of
perjury, or any fraudulent act, practice, or representation of the prevailing party, may be set aside in an action brought for that purposo
by the aggrieved party . . . within three years after the discovery

by him of such perjury or fraud ...

Literally interpreted, this section would appear to be applicable
no matter what type of fraud or perjury is involved. The Minnesota Supreme Court, however, in defining the power conferred by
this section, has distinguished between extrinsic and intrinsic fraud
or perjury and has only applied the section to the former.12 The
court has indicated that relief from intrinsic fraud or perjury must
be sought under the "for good cause shown" clause of section
544.32 and, hence, that the power to grant such relief is subject
to the one-year limitation period and other requirements prescribed
by that section." In view of the fact that the period within which
relief may be granted varies substantially depending on the nature
of the fraud or perjury, it is not difficult to perceive the crucial
importance the foregoing distinction may assume in a particular
case.
The word "extrinsic" is used in the sense of being outside or
collateral to the issues involved in the litigation; the fraud or perjury must relate to something "extrinsic" to what occurred in the
actual trial and to the evidence produced concerning the issues being litigated.74 Thus, only fraud or perjury that prevented the
defrauded party from fully presenting his case in court can be
classified as extrinsic." To induce a party into not appearing
71. See cases cited note 27 supra.
72. Tankar Gas, Inc. v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 215 Minn. 265,

9 N.W.2d 754 (1943); Bloomquist v. Thomas, 215 Minn. 35, 9 N.W.2d
337 (1943); In re Estate of Jordan, 199 Minn. 53, 271 N.W. 104 (1937);
Saari v. Puustinen, 161 Minn. 267, 209 N.W. 434 (1925); Brockman v.
Brockman, 133 Minn. 148, 157 N.W. 1086 (1916); Hass v. Billings, 42
Minn. 63, 43 N.W. 797 (1889).
73. In re Estate of Jordan, 199 Minn. 53, 271 N.W. 104 (1937).
74. Nichols v. Village of Morristown, 204 Minn. 212, 283 N.W. 748

(1938).
75. In re Estate of Jordan, 199 Minn. 53, 271 N.W. 104 (1937). In
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at the trial by false offers of compromise or by assurances that his
interest will be adequately protected constitutes extrinsic fraud.76
Conversely, intrinsic fraud or perjury is fraud or perjury that occurs during the course of the actual trial and relates to the evidence produced to establish issues being litigated."r Thus, deliberately falsified documentary evidence as well as testimony used
during the course of the trial constitute intrinsic fraud or perjury.,
The power to grant relief under section 548.14 has been found
to be equitable in nature and, therefore, governed by equitable
principles.79 Thus, even though the application for relief is made
within three years after the discovery of such fraud or perjury, a
party may be barred by laches if it is established that he did not
proceed with diligence.8 0
The fact that this power has been found to be equitable in nature also accounts for the distinction that has been drawn between
extrinsic and intrinsic fraud. It is established doctrine that a court
of equity cannot grant relief from a judgment or decree obtained by means of fraud or perjury unless the fraud or perjury prevented the party seeking relief from fully presenting his case in
court."1 The rationale behind this doctrine is that the danger of
repeated retrial of cases following the setting aside of judgments
or decrees obtained by false evidence produced at the trial outweighs the interest of doing justice in each particular case. - Although this argument is appealing, there is an even more persuasive response. First, the danger of repeated litigation can be minimized by placing a heavy burden on the party seeking to set
Saari v. Puustinen, 161 Minn. 367, 368, 201 N.W. 434 (1925), the court said

that "when a party is apprised of his adversary's claim by the pleadings,

is in position to investigate and meet it, is not misled, and is not dependent
upon him for proof, an action under the statute will not lie." See also
Street v. Town of Alden, 62 Minn. 160, 64 N.W. 157 (1895).
76. Tankar Gas, Inc. v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 215 Minn. 265, 9
N.W.2d 754 (1943); Street v. Town of Alden, 62 Minn. 160, 64 N.W. 157
(1895).
77. In re Estate of Jordan, 199 Minn. 53, 271 N.W. 104 (1937); Saari

v. Puustinen, 161 Minn. 367, 201 N.W. 434 (1925).
78. Cf. In re Estate of Woodworth, 207 Minn. 563, 292 N.W. 192
(1940)..
79. See Brockman v. Brockman, 133 Minn. 148, 157 N.W. 1086
(1916); Geisberg v. O'Laughlin, 88 Minn. 431, 93 N.W. 310 (1903).

80. Brockman v. Brockman, 133 Minn. 148, 157 N.W. 1086 (1916).
81. United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61 (1878); Note, 22
HARV. L. REv. 600, 601 (1909).
82. United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61 (1878); Hass v. Billings,
42 Minn. 63, 43 N.W. 797 (1889); Note, 22 HARV. L. REV. 600, 601
(1909).
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aside the decree of establishing not only that the evidence was in
fact false, but that it was intentionally false."3 Both fraud and
perjury require some element of intentional falsification. Second, a
mere showing that some of the evidence produced by the prevailing party was false would not necessarily justify the setting aside
of the decree,8" for the decree under attack must be the direct
result of such evidence. Finally, if fraud or perjury during the trial
is established and the decree obtained by it is set aside, it is extremely unlikely that the guilty litigant will be desirous of carrying the cause any further by attacking the second decree on the
basis that it too was obtained by false evidence."5 Thus, the danger of repeated trials, if intrinsic fraud or perjury is recognized as
a sufficient ground for setting aside a decree under section 548.14,
may in fact be illusory.
Furthermore, the Minnesota Supreme Court in adopting the extrinsic-intrinsic distinction seemed to contravene the clear meaning
of section 548.14. That section on its face confers the power to
grant relief without regard to the type of fraud or perjury used
to obtain the decree. The word "perjury" means deliberately giving
false testimony during the course of a trial; at least this is the
most common meaning and the meaning that the legislature most
probably considered when the statute was enacted. Because of the
difficulty in conceiving of perjury that is extrinsic in nature, the
court in limiting the applicability of section 548.14 to extrinsic
fraud or perjury has in practical effect read the word "perjury"
out of the statute completely.
D.

THE PROTECTION To BE ACCORDED THE RIGHTS OF INNOCENT THIRD PARTIES

There is some uncertainty under the existing law as to the
amount of protection to be accorded the rights of such innocent
third parties affected by the granting of relief from a decree as
bona fide purchasers of property distributed under a probate decree. Where relief is sought from extrinsic fraud or perjury under
section 548.14, it is clear that the rights of such parties will be
accorded full protection since that section expressly provides that
relief shall not be granted so as to effect any rights or interests of
an innocent third party." In the case of relief from mistake or
"for good cause shown," however, the statute gives explicit pro83. See Shammas v. Shammas, 9 N.J. 321, 88 A.2d 204 (1952); Note,
22 HARV. L. REV. 600, 602 (1909).
84. See Shammas v. Shammas, 9 N.J. 321, 88 A.2d 204 (1952).
85. Ibid.
86. MINN. STAT. § 548.14 (1961).
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tection only to bona fide purchasers of realty, and such purchasers
receive this protection only after the decree under which the realty
was distributed has been recorded in the office of the register of
deeds for a period of three years.' Moreover, where relief is
sought from the results of a clerical error, there is no statutory
provision for the protection of innocent third parties nor is there
any case law defining such protection.
The result would appear rather anomalous. If the equities of
the innocent third party are superior to those of the party seeking
relief from a decree obtained by fraud, they are even more
clearly superior where the party is seeking relief from his own mistake and is by definition at least partly responsible for the error.
Furthermore, even if the responsibility for the error does not lie
with the party seeking relief, he, being a party to the proceedings,
has a better opportunity to discover the error and should not be
able to obtain relief prejudicial to the rights of an innocent third
party. Thus, regardless of the grounds upon which relief from a
decree is sought the equities would appear to lie on the side of
the innocent third party, and his rights should be protected.
CONCLUSION
The power of the probate court or of any other court to grant
relief from a decree involves a compromise between two conflicting principles. On the one hand, litigation should, within a reasonable time, terminate in a decree that is final and binding upon the
parties. This principle is especially compelling in the case of probate proceedings, which almost invariably involve the title to realty.
On the other hand, justice should be accorded the parties in each
individual case. Because of their special nature and because parties
interested in them are usually not represented by counsel, error
committed in probate proceedings will more likely remain undiscovered for a long period of time, and injustice will more likely
result, than in proceedings in the district court. Thus, both of the
foregoing principles apply with added vigor to probate proceedings, and any evaluation of the adequacy of the power of the probate court to grant relief from its decrees must proceed with these
principles in mind.
Although the power of the probate court to grant relief from its
decrees appears adequate to remedy the great bulk of inequities that
may arise, there is a need for legislative action in this area. Reference to the powers of the district court to determine the powers
87. MINN. STAT. § 544.32 (1961).
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of the probate court under section 525.02(4) has not proved
satisfactory. A single concise but comprehensive statute should be
enacted that applies solely to the probate court and that enumerates the grounds upon which relief can be granted in the manner
of Rule 60 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure. The enactment of a statute solely applicable to the probate court would
enable the legislature to focus its attention on the special nature of
the proceedings in probate court and the special needs of such
proceedings. In drafting such a statute, the legislature should consider the merits of the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic
fraud and whether different periods within which relief can be
granted, based on this distinction, are justified. Also, such a statute should prescribe adequate protection for the rights of innocent
third parties who might be affected by relief from a probate decree.

